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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                           
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal in a "Lemon law" case presents the question 
whether the district court erred in dismissing for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction the claims of the plaintiff, James 
Suber, brought against Chrysler Corporation on account of alleged 
defects in the 1993 Dodge Ram 250 Conversion Van that he 
purchased from a Chrysler dealership, Cherry Hill Dodge.  The 
district court held that Suber's claims failed to meet the 
$50,000 amount in controversy requirement of the federal 
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, inasmuch as: (1) the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act was inapplicable, rendering Suber 
ineligible for the treble damages that are available under that 
statute; and (2) Suber's remaining claims did not satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirement.   
 We review the dismissal of Suber's complaint for 
failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction, hence we 
consider only whether plaintiff's claims, taken as true, allege 
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facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district 
court.  Licata v. U.S. Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259, 260 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Because we find that the district court dismissed the 
complaint without properly evaluating Suber's claims under the 
prevailing standard of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab 
Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), we vacate and remand for further 
proceedings.  
I. Facts1 
 Suber purchased the Dodge van from Cherry Hill Dodge 
("the dealership") on April 28, 1993.2  Prior to Suber's 
purchase, Kontinental Koaches, Inc., a third-party defendant, 
renovated the van, installing new seats, carpeting, upholstery, a 
sofa, and other accessories.  The sticker price of the car, with 
these improvements, was approximately $29,895.00.  Almost 
immediately after taking possession, Suber discovered problems 
with the van, especially its suspension.  In particular, the van 
had a tendency to "bottom out," even on relatively smooth road 
surfaces.   
 Suber avers that he returned the van to the dealer at 
least four times over the course of several months.  When he 
returned the van on May 10, 1993, he complained of the "bottoming 
out," as well as a harsh ride, steering drift, and other defects. 
 One week later, on May 17, 1993, he complained about the van's 
                     
     
1The facts are drawn from Suber’s complaint, Suber’s 
deposition testimony, and the briefs and accompanying exhibits 
submitted pursuant to Chrysler’s motion for summary judgment. 
     
2It is unclear from the record whether Cherry Hill Dodge is 
owned by Chrysler or is privately owned. 
  
 
 4 
suspension, steering, brakes, driver's seat, rear door handle, 
electrical system, and the running boards.  The dealership told 
Suber that nothing was wrong with the van, but balanced the 
tires.   
 Because the problems with his van persisted, Suber 
returned to the dealership on June 9, 1993 with the same 
complaints.  The dealership serviced the van, by aligning the 
front end and balancing the wheels, but again told Suber that 
there was nothing wrong.  A few weeks later, on or around June 
25, 1993, the van "bottomed out" so severely that it caused one 
of the front tires to go flat.  Suber had the tire replaced on 
his own, without returning to the dealership.   
 On June 28, 1993, Suber filed a claim with the Customer 
Arbitration Board ("CAB"), an informal dispute resolution body 
established by Chrysler under the New Jersey Lemon Law, N.J.S.A 
56:12-36.  Pursuant to CAB procedures, a Chrysler representative, 
George Bomanski, and a dealership employee inspected and road 
tested the van.  According to Suber, both men told him that there 
was a problem with the van's suspension.  However, the official 
report filed by Bomanski stated that the suspension system was 
fine.  By letter dated August 5, 1993, the CAB found that Suber's 
complaint regarding the suspension was groundless, and it denied 
Suber's request for a refund of the purchase price because "the 
use, value and safety of [the] vehicle has not been substantially 
impaired."3    
                     
     
3The CAB did rule that Chrysler was responsible for 
repairing the door panel, handle, and exterior trim, and 
performing an oil usage test.  It also ruled, however, that the 
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 According to Suber, the suspension problems persisted 
through July 1993.  The van failed Pennsylvania motor vehicle 
inspection at that time because of its suspension, including 
"obviously compressed front springs."  Additionally, Suber claims 
that he returned the van to the dealership on two occasions when 
the dealership did not supply him with a copy of the repair 
invoice.   
 On July 16, 1993, Suber again left the van with the 
dealership for service.  This appears to be the same day that he 
met with Bomanski and the dealership employee for the CAB 
inspection.  The dealership told him that it would contact him 
when the repairs were completed.  On August 16, 1993, having 
heard nothing, he called and was informed that his van was not 
yet ready.  He went to the dealership and found his van parked in 
the back lot.  The dealership's repair invoices show that the 
last work on the van was performed on July 22, 1993. 
 Subsequent to Suber's last repair attempt, Chrysler 
sent to owners of 1993 and 1994 Dodge Ram Vans and Wagons, 
including Suber, a "Customer Satisfaction Notification."  This 
notice informed these Dodge owners that the front coil springs on 
their vehicles needed to be replaced: 
The service is needed to prevent the front suspension 
from bottoming out when traveling over rough 
surfaces.  Without the service we are 
offering, the vehicle identified on the 
enclosed form may exhibit a harsh ride or 
suspension noises.  We ask that you arrange 
for this important service without delay.   
 
                                                                  
other alleged defects either did not exist or were not the result 
of a Chrysler manufacturing defect.  App. 305A. 
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In conjunction with this notice, Chrysler sent to its dealers a 
"Technical Services Bulletin" dated September 3, 1993 that 
detailed the repair work necessary to correct suspension problems 
like those experienced by Suber. 
 Suber contends that his van's suspension is defective 
to this day, and that the van has never passed the Pennsylvania 
inspection.  A mechanic retained by Suber's counsel inspected the 
car on March 2, 1995 and found that the suspension system was in 
an "extremely dangerous condition" and that the car was unsafe to 
drive.  In response, Chrysler points out that Suber has continued 
to drive the van.  At the time of the CAB inspection in July 
1993, the van had 5057 miles on it.  When a Chrysler 
representative road tested the van on March 13, 1995, it had 
16,514 miles on it.  The Chrysler representative concluded that 
the van has no suspension problems.   
II. Procedural History 
 Suber filed a complaint against Chrysler in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging 
violations of the New Jersey Automobile Lemon Law, N.J.S.A § 
56:12-29 et seq.; the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
2301 et seq.; the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code, N.J.S.A. § 
12A:1-101 et seq.; and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, 
N.J.S.A. § 56:8-1 et seq. ("NJCFA").  Suber alleged that the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the 
diversity statute because the amount in controversy exceeds 
$50,000.4  Soon after the complaint was filed, the district court 
                     
     
4The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires that the amount in 
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considered sua sponte whether it had subject matter jurisdiction 
and issued an Order to Show Cause.  The plaintiff responded by 
letter, and the court withdrew the order.  Chrysler then moved 
for summary judgment, asserting that the evidence could not 
support Suber's legal claims. 
 On September 5, 1995, the district court sua sponte 
dismissed Suber's complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), holding that the amount 
in controversy did not exceed $50,000.  Relying on a New Jersey 
Appellate Division decision, D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf 
Corp., 501 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), the court 
held that the "New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, which contains a 
mandatory treble damage provision, is inapplicable to the case at 
bar,"  Mem. Op. at 3-4, because Suber failed to "provide [the 
district court] with evidence of defendant's allegedly 
unconscionable conduct or 'substantial aggravating circumstances' 
surrounding defendant's alleged breach of the express 
warranties."  Id. at 3.  Under D’Ercole Sales, breach of warranty 
without substantial aggravating circumstances is not actionable 
as a NJCFA claim. 
 Having found that Suber could not rely on the treble 
damages available under the NJCFA to meet the amount in 
controversy requirement, the court stated that it was satisfied 
"to a legal certainty" that Suber's remaining claims could not 
exceed the $50,000 barrier.  Id. at 4.  It reasoned that the 
                                                                  
controversy exceed $50,000 to establish federal jurisdiction, 
even though it is a federal provision.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d). 
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maximum amount that the plaintiff could recover under either the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act or the Lemon Law is the full refund 
price of the vehicle if found defective, $29,895.00.  The court 
noted that attorney's fees should be included, but stated that 
these fees would have to exceed $20,105.00 to get to the 
jurisdictional amount, which it held would be clearly excessive. 
 Id. 
 Suber has filed a timely appeal, contending primarily 
that the district court failed to apply the proper test for 
determining the amount in controversy.  Our review of the order 
dismissing the complaint is plenary.  See Packard v. Provident 
Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Upp v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 510 U.S. 964 (1993). 
III.  The Amount in Controversy Requirement 
 For a plaintiff to establish federal diversity 
jurisdiction, the amount in controversy must exceed $50,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  The 
standard for determining whether a plaintiff's claims satisfy the 
amount in controversy requirement was set out by the Supreme 
Court in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 
283 (1938), as follows: 
The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction 
in cases brought in the federal court is 
that, unless the law gives a different rule, 
the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if 
the claim is apparently made in good faith.  
It must appear to a legal certainty that the 
claim is really for less than the 
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. 
  
Id. at 288-89 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also 
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Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1971).  In 
applying the "legal certainty" test established by St. Paul 
Mercury, this Court has stated that "dismissal is appropriate 
only if the federal court is certain that the jurisdictional 
amount cannot be met."  Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. 
Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995); cf. Lunderstadt v. 
Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding in a 
federal question case that "a federal court may dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction only if the claims are 'insubstantial on their 
face'").   
 Once a good faith pleading of the amount in controversy 
vests the district court with diversity jurisdiction, the court 
retains jurisdiction even if the plaintiff cannot ultimately 
prove all of the counts of the complaint or does not actually 
recover damages in excess of $50,000.  St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. 
at 288.  Accordingly, the question whether a plaintiff's claims 
pass the "legal certainty" standard is a threshold matter that 
should involve the court in only minimal scrutiny of the 
plaintiff's claims.  The court should not consider in its 
jurisdictional inquiry the legal sufficiency of those claims or 
whether the legal theory advanced by the plaintiffs is probably 
unsound; rather, a court can dismiss the case only if there is a 
legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover more than 
$50,000.  As we stated in Lunderstadt, the "threshold to 
withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is 
thus lower than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion."  Lunderstadt, 885 F.2d at 70; Batoff v. State Farm Ins. 
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Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 The temporal focus of the court's evaluation of whether 
the plaintiff could conceivably prevail on its claim is on the 
time that the complaint was filed.  While courts generally rely on 
the plaintiff's allegations of the amount in controversy as 
contained in the complaint, "where a defendant or the court 
challenges the plaintiff's allegations regarding the amount in 
question, the plaintiff who seeks the assistance of the federal 
courts must produce sufficient evidence to justify its claims."  
Columbia Gas, 62 F.3d at 541.  We have also held that "the record 
must clearly establish that after jurisdiction was challenged the 
plaintiff had an opportunity to present facts by affidavit or by 
deposition, or in an evidentiary hearing, in support of his 
jurisdictional contention."  Berardi v. Swanson Memorial Lodge No. 
48 of the Fraternal Order of Police, 920 F.2d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 
1990) (quoting Local 336, American Federation of Musicians, AFL-
CIO v. Bonatz, 475 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1973)); see also 5A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1350, at 213-18 (2d ed. 1990). 
 The question whether there is a legal certainty that 
Suber's claims are for less than $50,000 depends on what damages 
Suber could conceivably recover under New Jersey state law, and we 
must therefore consider the applicable New Jersey statutes and 
Suber’s allegations under them. 
IV.  The New Jersey Lemon Law 
 The New Jersey Lemon Law provides a remedy to consumers 
who purchase defective vehicles, as Suber claims he has.  Under 
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this law, if a consumer reports a "nonconformity" in a vehicle to 
the manufacturer or its dealer during the first 18,000 miles or 
within two years of the date of delivery to the consumer, the 
manufacturer must make, or arrange with the dealer to make, the 
necessary repairs "within a reasonable time."  N.J.S.A. 56:12-31. 
 The statute defines a "nonconformity" as a "defect or condition 
which substantially impairs the use, value or safety of a motor 
vehicle."  Id. 56:12-30.  According to the New Jersey courts, 
whether a defect rises to the level of an actionable 
nonconformity depends on whether it "shakes the buyer's 
confidence" in the goods.  See Berrie v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
U.S.A., Inc., 630 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
 Thus, if a "reasonable person" in Suber's position could 
conclude that the "bottoming out" "impairs the use and value of 
the car and shakes [his] confidence in it," then the suspension 
problems with Suber's van qualify as nonconformities.  Id. at 
1183. 
 If the manufacturer or dealer is unable to correct the 
nonconformity within a reasonable time, the vehicle is a true 
"lemon" and the owner is entitled to damages.  The law presumes 
that a manufacturer is unable to correct a nonconformity within a 
reasonable time if the owner has made three or more unsuccessful 
repair attempts or the vehicle "is out of service by reason of 
repair for one or more nonconformities" for a total of twenty 
days.  N.J.S.A. 56:12-33.   
 We find that Suber has sufficiently alleged that the 
use and value of his van are impaired such that we cannot 
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conclude that the alleged suspension problems could not 
conceivably be found to constitute nonconformities.  Suber stated 
in his affidavit that the van has never passed the Pennsylvania 
inspection test, and a mechanic he hired has stated that it is 
unsafe to drive.  Chrysler recalled all 1993 Dodge Ram vans and 
wagons for the same defect, even while the dealership contended 
that there was nothing wrong with the van.  Suber has also 
alleged that his van presumptively cannot be fixed: in his 
affidavit, he stated that he has made more than three repair 
attempts and that the vehicle remained out of service for repairs 
for more than 20 days.  When his complaint was filed, then, it 
was conceivable that Suber's van was a true "lemon" and that he 
was entitled to recovery.5   
 If successful on his Lemon Law claims, Suber could 
recover the full refund value of the car plus collateral damages, 
mainly finance charges.  The statute provides: 
The manufacturer shall provide the consumer with a full 
refund of the purchase price of the original 
motor vehicle including any stated credit or 
allowance for the consumer's used motor 
vehicle, the cost of any options or other 
modifications arranged, installed, or made by 
the manufacturer or its dealer within 30 days 
after the date of original delivery, and any 
other charges or fees including, but not 
limited to, sales tax, license and 
registration fees, finance charges . . . less 
a reasonable allowance for vehicle use. 
                     
     
5There is evidence that shows that Suber's van has been 
driven for over 16,000 miles, calling into question Suber's 
claims that his car is valueless.  However, considering such 
evidence is not proper at the jurisdictional stage, unless that 
evidence suggests that the amount in controversy allegations were 
not made in good faith.  We conclude that this evidence does not 
make it certain that Suber could not prevail on his Lemon Law 
claim. 
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Id. 56:12-32 (emphasis added).  
 Moreover, in calculating the amount in controversy, we 
must consider potential attorney's fees.  Although 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 excludes "interest and costs" from the amount in 
controversy, attorney's fees are necessarily part of the amount 
in controversy if such fees are available to successful 
plaintiffs under the statutory cause of action.  See Missouri 
State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933).  They are 
here.  See N.J.S.A. 56:12-42 ("In any action by a consumer 
against a manufacturer brought in Superior Court or in the 
division pursuant to the provisions of this act, a prevailing 
consumer shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees, fees for 
expert witnesses and costs."). 
 The district court began and ended its inquiry with the 
sticker price of the van, which was $29,895.  Because we have 
concluded that it is conceivable that Suber’s van is a total 
“lemon,” we agree that Suber is entitled to include the entire 
sticker price of the van in the amount in controversy.  Without 
considering potential collateral charges, however, the district 
court dismissed the complaint because the attorney's fees that 
would be available to Suber if he prevailed could not get him 
over $50,000.  The district court erred, therefore, in not 
considering the collateral charges, particularly finance charges, 
as part of the amount in controversy.   
 The question before us, then, is how to calculate 
Suber's collateral charges for purposes of the amount in 
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controversy inquiry.  According to Suber, his total Lemon Law 
damages are $40,015.20.  As stated on his contract with the 
dealership, sales tax and registration fees bring the cost of the 
van to $31,649.  Once finance charges are added, Suber alleges 
that the total cost of the van is $41,404.20.6  As calculated by 
Suber, the reasonable allowance for use that is required to be 
deducted pursuant to the Lemon Law is $1,389.10, which brings the 
total to $40,015.20.7  If Suber’s allegation is correct, 
attorney’s fees necessary to get him above the $50,000 threshold 
might not be unreasonable. 
 However, in considering Suber's claimed amount in 
controversy, we are given pause by his contention that he is 
entitled to count the total finance charges stated in the 
financing agreement toward the amount in controversy.  We find 
this unlikely.  Suber would pay the total charges if it took him 
the entire finance period to pay for the van, but not if he paid 
off the car loan before that time.  Under New Jersey law, a 
borrower may prepay a retail installment sales loan in full at 
                     
     
6Suber financed $26,779.11.  With an 8.5% interest rate, his 
total finance charges are $8595.21.  Suber’s down payment, which 
included cash, a rebate, and the value of his trade-in, was 
$6029.88.  Added together, this brings the total price as stated 
in the Retail Sales Installment Contract to $41,404.20. 
 The amount financed includes optional credit life insurance 
that totals $1085.99. 
     
7Under N.J.S.A. 56:12-30, the reasonable allowance for 
vehicle use is calculated by multiplying the purchase price by 
the mileage at the time the consumer first presents the vehicle 
to the dealer for repair of the nonconformity and dividing that 
number by 100,000 miles.  In this case, if $41,404.20 is 
multiplied by 3,355 (the mileage at the time of the first 
suspension complaint), and then that is divided by 100,000, the 
result is $1,389.10. 
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any time and obtain a credit for unaccrued interest.  N.J.S.A. 
17:16C-43.  If, for example, Suber had made his car payments for 
three months, and then decided to pay the remaining principal on 
his loan, the only finance charges he would pay would be the 
interest included in the three payments that he made.  He would 
be entitled to a refund for the remaining, unpaid finance 
charges.  Concomitantly, had Suber been awarded Lemon Law damages 
by the district court after making three car payments, his 
damages would include only those finance charges that he had 
paid.  See, e.g., Gambrill v. Alfa Romeo, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 
1047, 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (calculating damages under 
Pennsylvania Lemon Law).8   Accordingly, it seems to us that 
Suber will be entitled to recover in this action only those 
finance charges that he has paid at the time of the judgment. 
 The question of how to determine finance charges for 
the purposes of the amount in controversy requirement is thus a 
difficult one that involves a measure of speculation.  We have 
held that the amount in controversy should not be “measured by 
the low end of an open-ended claim, but rather by a reasonable 
reading of the value of the rights being litigated.”  Angus v. 
Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).  Because the 
district court failed to make this determination with respect to 
the finance charges that Suber can include in the amount in 
controversy, it erred in concluding that there is a legal 
                     
     
8The same is true for the credit life insurance that Suber 
financed.  He would be entitled to a refund of the unaccrued 
premiums upon prepayment of the loan.  N.J.S.A. 17:16D-14. 
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certainty that Suber’s claims are for less that $50,000.   
 We thus will vacate the district court’s order and will 
remand the case so that the court can determine whether Suber’s 
Lemon Law claim allows him to establish diversity jurisdiction.  
In making this determination, the district court should consider 
the purchase price of the van, all collateral charges, and 
potential attorney’s fees.  As Suber’s van is conceivably a total 
“lemon,” the district court should start with the purchase price, 
$29,895, and add to it sales tax and registration fees, which 
bring the total to $31,649.  The district court must then 
determine the amount of any finance charges and attorneys' fees 
includable in Suber's amount in controversy. 
V.  New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
 We now turn to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
(“NJCFA”) to determine whether Suber can satisfy the amount in 
controversy requirement under that law.  The NJCFA allows private 
plaintiffs to bring suit if they are harmed by an unconscionable 
commercial practice.  See, e.g., Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 
A.2d 454, 460-61 (N.J. 1994).  Under the NJCFA, the: 
act, use or employment by any person of any 
unconscionable commercial practice, 
deception, fraud, false pretense, false 
promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, 
concealment, suppression, or omission of any 
material fact with intent that others rely 
upon such concealment, suppression or 
omission, in connection with the sale . . . 
or with the subsequent performance of such 
person as aforesaid, whether or not any 
person has in fact been misled, deceived or 
damaged thereby, is declared to be an 
unlawful practice. 
N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.  If a defendant is found to have committed an 
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unconscionable commercial practice, the statute imposes mandatory 
treble damages and attorney's fees.  Id. 56:8-19. 
 Suber also relies on the NJCFA to establish subject 
matter jurisdiction.  He submits that he has sufficiently alleged 
that Chrysler committed unconscionable commercial practices 
within the meaning of the NJCFA and that he can, therefore, 
include possible NJCFA damages in the amount in controversy, in 
particular, the treble damages that are available under that 
statute. 
 The district court rejected this contention and held 
that there is a legal certainty that Suber cannot recover under 
the NJCFA.  It concluded that Suber has not alleged any facts 
that could constitute a NJCFA violation because Suber’s only 
claim is for breach of warranty, which is not actionable under 
the NJCFA.  The court, relying on the New Jersey Appellate 
Division case, D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 501 A.2d 
990 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), held that Suber has failed 
to allege "substantial aggravating circumstances,” which New 
Jersey law requires to recover for a breach of warranty. 
 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has approved of 
certain language from D'Ercole Sales, see Cox, 647 A.2d at 462, 
it has never directly considered the issue before the D’Ercole 
Sales court and thus has never explicitly adopted its holding.  
In D’Ercole Sales, the court held that a truck assembler's 
failure to honor the warranty was not an "unconscionable consumer 
practice" within the meaning of the NJCFA.  In so holding, the 
court stated that "a breach of warranty, or any breach of 
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contract, is not per se unfair or unconscionable, and a breach of 
warranty alone does not violate a consumer protection statute."  
501 A.2d at 998 (citations omitted).  While acknowledging that a 
breach of warranty is unfair to the non-breaching party, it 
stated that: 
 
"[i]n a sense, unfairness inheres in every breach of 
contract when one of the contracting parties 
is denied the advantage for which he 
contracted, but this is why remedial damages 
are awarded on contract claims.  If such an 
award is to be trebled, the . . . legislature 
must have intended that substantial 
aggravating circumstances be present." 
Id. at 1001 (emphasis added) (quoting United Roasters, Inc. v. 
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1981)).  
Because this holding seems unexceptionable, uncontroversial, and 
altogether sensible, we predict that D’Ercole Sales would be 
followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and hence we find that 
the District Court correctly concluded that the NJCFA requires 
that substantial aggravating circumstances be shown when the 
basis for the NJCFA claim is breach of warranty. 
 Assuming, therefore, that a plaintiff needs to show 
substantial aggravating circumstances to prevail under the NJCFA 
with what is essentially a breach of warranty claim, we conclude 
that the district court incorrectly held that Suber has not 
alleged sufficient aggravating circumstances to prevail at the 
jurisdictional stage.9  Suber has made allegations that, if 
                     
     
9Because we cannot determine from the record whether 
Chrysler owns the dealership, we consider only those allegations 
of unconscionable practices made against Chrysler directly. 
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proven, could constitute substantial aggravating circumstances, 
such that we cannot find that recovery is precluded to a legal 
certainty.  For example, in his affidavit, Suber states that 
George Bomanski, a Chrysler representative, told Suber that the 
van had suspension problems, but his official report, on which 
the CAB based its decision, noted that there were no suspension 
problems.  Moreover, Suber's allegations that Chrysler knew of 
the problem are supported by the Technical Services Bulletin, 
which stated that all 1993 and 1994 Dodge Ram vans and wagons 
needed repair to correct the suspension problem about which Suber 
complained. 
 At all events, we find that Suber's NJCFA claim appears 
to be premised on more than mere breach of warranty.  The Lemon 
Law has defined certain practices as per se unlawful within the 
meaning of the NJCFA.  In particular, each time a motor vehicle 
is returned for examination or repair during the first 18,000 
miles of operation or within two years of purchase, “the 
manufacturer through its dealer shall provide to the consumer an 
itemized, legible statment of repair.”  N.J.S.A. 56:12-34 (b).  
Failure to comply with this provision constitutes an unlawful 
practice under the NJCFA.  Id. 56:12-34 (c).  Suber testified in 
his deposition that he left the dealership without receiving 
repair invoices on at least two occasions.   
 It thus appears that Suber may not be precluded to a 
legal certainty from recovering under the NJCFA.  Even though we 
have explained that the court should include the treble damages 
available under the NJCFA in calculating the amount in 
  
 
 20 
controversy, we are uncertain as to what his NJCFA damages would 
be.  The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA) allows private 
plaintiffs to recover for any "ascertainable loss" from an 
allegedly unconscionable practice,  N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 & 56:8-19, 
and imposes mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees, id. 
56:8-19.  Suber contends that his Lemon Law damages of $40,015.10 
are also his NJCFA damages and should be trebled to arrive at 
$120,045.30 in damages.  That seems unlikely to us.  
Unfortunately, the New Jersey Supreme Court has provided little 
guidance about quantifying ascertainable loss under the NJCFA.  
Because we have already determined that a vacatur and remand is 
appropriate in this case, the remand will also permit the 
district court to calculate Suber’s potential NJCFA damages and 
thus determine whether there is a legal certainty that the claim 
is for less that $50,000, once those damages are trebled. 
 On remand, the court must also determine whether 
Suber’s claims can be aggregated.  The general rule is that 
claims brought by a single plaintiff against a single defendant 
can be aggregated when calculating the amount in controversy, 
regardless of whether the claims are related to each other.  
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969) (“Aggregation has been 
permitted . . . in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to 
aggregate two or more of his own claims against a single 
defendant.”); see also 1 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal 
Practice ¶ 0.97, at 907-08 (2d ed. 1995); 14A Charles Alan Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3704 (2d ed. 1985).  
Based on this general rule, we think that Suber’s Lemon Law and 
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NJCFA claims can probably be aggregated.  We are given pause, 
however, by our understanding that these two claims could not be 
aggregated if Suber could not recover damages for both.  That is, 
if these claims are alternative bases of recovery for the same 
harm under state law, Suber could not be awarded damages for 
both, and a court should not aggregate the claims to arrive at 
the amount in controversy.   
 We think it is likely that the harms sought to be 
remedied by the Lemon Law and the Consumer Fraud Act are, in 
fact, qualitatively different: the Lemon Law seeks to put a 
consumer in as good a position as he or she would have been in 
had he or she not purchased the “lemon,” while the NJCFA remedies 
the particular “ascertainable loss” suffered by a consumer by 
reason of an unconscionable commercial practice.  This 
understanding has also informed our conclusion, explained above, 
that Suber’s potential “ascertainable loss,” for purposes of the 
NJCFA, is probably not the value of the van.  On the other hand, 
we are not entirely confident of these conclusions, and we were 
cited to no New Jersey courts addressing this question (nor have 
we found any).  But this issue was not briefed by the parties, 
and they may find some cases.  At all events, since we remand 
here, we leave the aggregation question in the first instance to 
the district court upon remand. 
VI.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
and remand this case to the district court to determine, applying 
the standard of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 
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303 U.S. 283 (1938), whether there is a legal certainty that 
Suber’s claims are for less than $50,000.  Upon remand, the 
district court must give Suber the opportunity to develop the 
record in support of his jurisidictional claim, whether through 
affidavits, depositions, or an evidentiary hearing.  In remanding 
this case to the district court, we note that the district court 
will also need to consider the availability of diversity 
jurisdiction under Suber’s U.C.C. or Magnuson-Moss Act claims,10 
as well as whether Suber’s Lemon Law and NJCFA claims can be 
aggregated in calculating the amount in controversy.    
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be vacated and the case remanded for further 
                     
     
10Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("Magnuson-Moss"), 15 
U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., a consumer who is damaged by the failure 
of a dealer or manufacturer to comply with a warranty obligation 
can file suit to recover the purchase price plus collateral 
damages.  Id.  § 2310(d).  Although it is a federal provision, 
federal jurisdiction under Magnuson-Moss is limited to those 
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.  Id. § 
2310(d)(3)(B).   
 Despite the similarities of this provision to the Lemon Law, 
whether a plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy threshold 
is a different question under Magnuson-Moss.  Section 2310(d)(3) 
expressly excludes "interests and costs" from the calculation of 
the amount in controversy.  Unlike the federal diversity statute, 
the courts that have considered whether attorney fees are costs 
within the meaning of the statute have uniformly concluded that 
they are and thus must be excluded from the amount in controversy 
determination.  See, e.g., Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 
F.2d 1058, 1069 (5th Cir. 1984); Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 
1033 (4th Cir. 1983); Mele v. BMW of North America, Inc., No. 93-
2399, 1993 WL 469124, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 1993). 
 Although Suber could therefore probably not establish 
jurisdiction with his Magnuson-Moss claim, we leave that question 
to the district court upon remand.  If the district court finds 
that Suber has established diversity jurisdiction with his Lemon 
Law or NJCFA claim, the court can exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the Magnuson-Moss Act claim.  28 U.S.C. § 
1367(a). 
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proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The parties shall bear 
their own costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
